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Abstract 
The introduction of the euro as legal tender in most member states of the European Union (EU) 
has further stimulated financial market integration in Europe and beyond. Yet, political 
manoeuvres have shaped – and sometimes threatened – this process. In this paper, we examine 
how the summit meetings of the European Union and events that are often considered to be 
ineffectual have influenced the ups and downs in the euro-dollar exchange rate. Using daily data, 
we show, with the help of a standard tool in financial econometrics, a GARCH model that 
summits decrease rather than increase the volatility of this series. Further event studies 
demonstrate that, while some summits have improved the standing of the European currency, the 
haggling over the Maastricht criteria at the Feira meeting has hurt the euro. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Political decisions made at the European Union (EU) level are widely perceived to be of little 
lasting importance. The European Council regularly gets together to tackle the organization’s 
most pressing problems, and these meetings are especially considered to be a waste of time and 
money. In order to save their reputation and to avoid upsetting the markets, the prime ministers 
of the EU member states often resort to vague diplomatic language, when summits end in failure 
and stalemate (e.g. Schneider and Cederman 1994). If, by contrast, the member states 
unexpectedly achieve a significant compromise in a disputed area, meetings typically end in 
verbose press conferences during which the heads of state and government frequently try to reap 
as much as possible from the collective glory.  
 
In light of this contrasting behaviour, we cannot assume that European summit meetings affect 
the economy in a regular way.  Given that, we know that some summit meetings have indeed 
generated serious effects on the economy; however, we do not know which meeting outcomes 
produce economically relevant effects or whether they influence, systematically, European 
markets. This paper tries to overcome this gap and explores how summits affect the expectations 
and uncertainty characterizing the financial community. In particular, we examine how EU 
summits have affected the euro-dollar exchange rate. In doing so, we contribute to the recently 
evolving literature on politics and financial markets (e.g. Schneider and Tröger 2006, Guidolin 
and LaFerrera 2005, Bernhard and Leblang 2002, Freeman et al. 2000). 
 
Hence, this paper attempts to clarify whether changes in euro-dollar exchange-rate investment 
returns could be better understood by incorporating the dynamics of the political environment. In 
doing so, we investigate whether members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) lack the 
willingness to adhere to the European integration process and how this may affect the valuation 
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of the euro.  We conduct a two-step empirical analysis: First, using daily data and with the help 
of a general autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, we demonstrate 
which kind of political events exert particular influence on the volatility of the euro-dollar 
exchange rates. In parallel, the analysis sheds some light on the potential impact that 
corresponding political events may have on average exchange-rate returns. Second, we highlight 
the effect of single political events on the level of returns for the euro with the help of an events-
related study. To do this, we consider twenty-seven European Council meetings within the 
former EU-15 during the years 1999-2005. 
 
The analysis yields interesting results regarding how the financial markets reacted to these 
meetings during the days that followed each event. What we see is that financial markets do take 
notice of European summits and their outcomes. For example, discernable but unanticipated 
conflict within the European Council triggers periods of volatile exchange- rate movements. 
Furthermore, apparent disputes among European heads of government give rise to doubts about 
the continuation of European political and economic integration, resulting in exchange-rate 
depreciation. Accordingly, our analysis disproves public dismissals concerning European 
summits as venues for “empty talk.” In this regard, financial investors seem to act more 
“European” than the ordinary public of national EU-member states. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The following section reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 sets forth the theoretical model of our study, which aims to determine the 
impact of political events on the euro’s valuation. The research design and the subsequent 
empirical analysis are covered in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes this paper and points to 
areas where further research would be warranted. 
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2  Survey of the literature 
Models of exchange-rate behaviour essentially rely on several statistical indicators – that is, 
macroeconomic variables such as money supply, output level, and the current account, among 
others. This field of research has also developed to make allowances for the role played by 
information availability (see below). Foreign exchange markets are considered efficient if 
markets reflect all available information. Hence, only new information can alter prices. This 
“efficient-market” hypothesis implies that the forward rate should be a perfect predictor of the 
future spot exchange rate (see Fama 1970, Fama and Miller 1972). However, it is generally 
acknowledged that the forward exchange rate does not operate as predicted by the efficient- 
market hypothesis, but that a “forward exchange rate bias” prevails. Such market inefficiency can 
result, for instance, from investors’ expectation errors or a time-varying risk premium attached to 
foreign-exchange rates (Froot and Frankel 1989, Fama 1984). The latter may be induced by 
political uncertainty – precisely the topic of our present inquiry. Political uncertainty may, 
accordingly, negatively affect levels and volatility of the euro-dollar exchange rate. 
 
One drawback found in the voluminous literature on exchange-rate movements is, in our view, its 
narrow focus on economic variables. This suggests that the effect of political decision-making on 
market expectations, and thus on exchange-rate behaviour, is effectively disregarded. That 
market agents form their expectations regarding exchange rates not only from economic 
fundamentals, but also from political events is recognized, but this added element is rarely 
studied formally. Among scholars,
 Bachman (1992) was probably the first to conduct 
econometric analyses, linking the impact of elections on selected exchange rates, e.g., currencies 
of the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada. Freeman et al. (2000) and, in 
addition, Hays et al. (2000) inquire into the effects of uncertainty about electoral outcomes and 
exchange-rate policy shifts, particularly from a theoretical point of view. 
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Further empirical research on the impact of elections and politically induced business cycles on 
exchange-rate behaviour often emphasizes the partisanship of the incumbent government: 
Forecasts of short-term exchange-rate behaviour regarding the US-dollar, British pound and 
German mark by Blomberg and Hess (1997) rely on political variables which capture party-, 
election- and candidate-specific characteristics. Lobo and Tufte (1998) also investigate the 
impact of partisanship on the volatility of the US-dollar exchange rate against Japanese Yen, 
British Pound, German Mark and Canadian dollar. In a similar way, Keef and Roush (2003) 
analyse the effects of political administration effects on New Zealand’s currency, whereas Siokis 
and Kapopoulos (2003) focus on the politically induced movements of the Greek drachma. 
Bernhard and Leblang (2004) and Leblang and Bernhard (2006) also test the effects of electoral 
change and opinion poll results on selected European exchange rates. The study of Kugler and 
Weder (2005) covers the impact of rare events such as the Tschernobyl nuclear accident and the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on returns for the Swiss Franc. 
 
Pantzalis, Strangeland, and Turtle (2000) analyze the influence of uncertainty surrounding 
elections on the value of securities. Perry and Robertson (1998), Herron (2000), McGillivray 
(2003), and Vuchelen (2003) test the impact of political events on financial- market behaviour. 
Studies that explore events beyond those related to elections and politically induced business-
cycle changes are rare. Notable exceptions include, for instance, Schneider and Tröger (2006) 
and Guidolin and La Ferrara (2005), who investigate the interrelationship of violent conflicts and 
stock market behaviour.  As another example, Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) study the impact 
of international agreements concerning debt restructuring on excessive volatility in Asian stock 
markets during the Asian crisis from1997-98. Voth (2004) considers the impact of institutional 
fragility and tumultuous politics of the interwar period on stock markets.  
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3  Theoretical model 
This section lays the theoretical foundations for the empirical analysis that follows. We establish 
a link between politics and the formation of foreign-exchange markets from the viewpoint of 
financial-market theory. More precisely, we model for possible consequences of political events, 
particularly the outcomes of various European summits, on euro-dollar exchange rates. 
 
When studying the interaction of political events and foreign-exchange markets, it is quite useful 
to refer to currencies as “asset prices.” A foreign-exchange rate not only reflects macroeconomic 
fundamentals and microeconomic risks, but also depends on expectations of future policies that 
may affect economic performance. The asset-price definition has been adopted by portfolio-
balanced approaches (see especially Frenkel and Mussa, 1980, 1985). The paper considers the 
exchange rate as one of the prices that equilibrate markets for financial assets. Spot exchange 
rates behave as asset prices. Accordingly, returns follow a random walk because investors form 
rational expectations concerning European governments their political course of action and, 
ultimately, the prospects of European integration (cf. Freeman et al. 2000). This suggests that 
exchange-rate movements can occur as a result of new information produced by political events. 
The asset-price definition of exchange rates fits perfectly into our analysis because it evidences 
links between political and market equilibria, i.e. political events and foreign exchange markets. 
 
The explicit modelling of international financial investor behaviour in order to explain exchange-
rate dynamics – i.e. whether portfolio balancing accounts for exchange-rate changes (Hau and 
Rey 2004) – has recently gained more attention in literature. When dealing with exchange rates 
as asset prices, while stressing exchange-rate returns, we enter a new field of research that 
investigates the interlinkage of risky assets and exchange-rate dynamics (Capiello and De Santis 
ssilvia  12/21/06 1:04 AM
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2005; Pavlova and Rigobon 2003; Brandt et al. 2001). In this respect, our analysis takes into 
account the impact of both equity and bond returns on the euro-dollar exchange rate. Such an 
approach allows the use of daily data which would be impossible were we considering, for 
instance, the influence that inflation and productivity differentials exert on exchange rates. 
Therefore, this “portfolio approach” fits perfectly with our purpose, that is, measuring the 
influence that particular categories of political events exert on the euro-dollar exchange rate. 
 
In general, political events may affect foreign exchange markets in two ways.  First, an event can 
trigger a de- or re-evaluation.   Second, a political event can set off periods of higher volatility 
and also end them.  A major problem encountered when determining influence is that markets 
seem to update and process political events at specific times in different ways. Mosley (2004), 
for instance, observes that in mature economies investors assess only macroeconomic 
fundamentals. However, the findings of Prast and de Vor (2005) suggest that this applies first and 
foremost to the US-economy; the case for economies within the euro area, even for those 
countries considered mature, is different. This observation suggests that markets and politics do 
not always seem to interact predictably across currencies.  
  
Uncertainty regarding the future political course of European integration may translate into the 
economic sphere: a loss of momentum in the process of European political integration may 
foreshadow stalemate of further European economic and financial integration. This, in turn, 
would negatively affect the prospects of future economic performance within Europe, 
particularly where it concerns returns on stock investments. At the same time, international 
investors may generally demand a higher risk premium on European securities, especially bonds, 
because perceived setbacks in the European integration process could lead to unexpected changes 
member-state economic policies, some of which could be detrimental to financial markets. 
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 By contrast, sending a signal that the European integration process will continue would help 
anchor market expectations. In other words, political events may either support or counter 
international investors’ expectations regarding the progress of European integration. The euro 
will adapt, accordingly. We conjecture that European summits, in particular, are suitable 
yardsticks by which to measure the willingness of  EU member states to adhere to the European 
integration process. 
 
A frequently researched issue in the related literature regards political uncertainty in foreign-
exchange markets stemming from national elections and their longer-term aftermath (Bernhard 
and Leblang 2002). Even in cases of highly predictable electoral outcomes, uncertainty about 
policy implementation may persist (see, for instance, Fowler 2006). Although European policy 
positions among leading parties within EMU member states are rarely clear-cut, election-related 
policy changes can exacerbate uncertainty about the progress of European integration. Elections 
are not the only source of unpredictability, however.  Financial investors may not fully 
comprehend European decision-making processes. Policy outcomes at the European level result 
from a complex interplay of policy formation between domestic and intergovernmental arenas. 
Economic agents have difficulties anticipating outcomes that ultimately arise from such multi-
tiered negotiations. Hence, international financial investors may view bargaining outcomes at the 
intergovernmental level as “more” new information with regard to the prospects for future 
European integration. Investor calculus may be consequently altered. 
 
The following section presents the research design for further empirical analysis of changes in 
volatility and levels of returns on the euro-dollar exchange rates. 
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4  Empirical analysis 
In the following paragraphs, we first introduce the GARCH modelling approach and event-data 
study methodology. Second, we define the exogenous variables, which include  economic 
indicators and a dummy variable for European Council meetings. Third, we test, empirically, the 
impact of the latter on investment returns for euro assets. 
 
4.1  Research Design 
This paper combines two analytical approaches: 1) the general autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) regression model and 2) “event-study” methodology. Our aim is to 
detect effects of the political event category on both the mean and volatility of (abnormal) returns 
of the euro-dollar exchange rate. The dependent variable “euro-dollar exchange rate” is expressed 
in US-dollar, indicating how many US-Dollars one gets in exchange for one euro. All financial 
time series data are logarithmic. Hence, differencing of logarithmic time-series evades the 
problem of unreasonable negative returns, that is, losses higher than 100%. Furthermore, 
correspondingly continuous returns may be summed to generate cumulative abnormal returns. 
The use of first-differenced and logarithmic data is commonly applied in financial time-series 
analysis. 
 
The GARCH technique is a standard tool in econometric finance and is frequently applied in 
modelling exchange-rate movements. We use this methodology to measure the mean and 
volatility of exchange-rate returns. A “family” of GARCH models evolved out of the seminal 
contributions from Bollerslev (1986) and Engle (1982). These econometric techniques account 
for “volatility clustering,” an almost ubiquitous phenomenon in high-frequency financial time 
series. The phenomenon describes conditional heteroskedasticity, i.e. that volatility – here, the 
variance in exchange-rate movements – comes in clusters where tranquil periods are interspersed 
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with volatile periods. Such conditional heteroskedasticity models imply that variance is not 
constant but time-dependent. This violates one of the key Gauss-Markov assumptions requisite 
for ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. A non-corrected OLS would convey a false sense of 
precision, as the standard errors are too narrow; hence, the null hypothesis would be rejected too 
often. 
 
The standard specification is a GARCH (1,1) model, for which the best predictor of the variance 
from one period to the next (essentially) constitutes a weighted average of the long-run 
(unconditional) variance, the variance predicted for the present period, and the new information – 
i.e. the occurrence of a political event – in terms of the recent squared residuals (Engle 2001). 
The first number in parentheses is the GARCH term, which represents the number of moving 
average lags, i.e. the lagged forecasted variance, in the regression. The second number depicts 
the ARCH term, which refers to previous random errors in terms of the number of lagged 
squared residuals in the regression. Such a regression model provides the framework for 
modelling time-varying volatility in political-event studies. In the context of our study, this 
means that a political event in the present period may amplify the impact of other events in future 
periods. 
 
The second methodology, the event study, helps us to investigate abnormal exchange-rate 
returns. In general, event studies aim to measure investor reactions to specific incidences that are 
of particular research interest. According to the asset price definition (see above), investments in 
the euro reflect the entire discounted value of future cash flows. Thus, from the viewpoint of 
financial investors, the future of European integration may influence both the political and 
economic well-being of Europe. Hence, exchange-rate reactions may be traced back to particular 
political events that affect the process of European integration. Usually, asset prices change 
Deleted: Fahrholz/SchneiderChristian Fahrholz     ACES CASES 2006.1 
 
Page 11 
New Media Center  1/22/07 3:39 PM
continuously over time. However, event studies attempt to disentangle event-related price 
movements from general market fluctuations. Returns on exchange rates respond to the arrival of 
new information as highlighted by other real asset price shifts. Therefore, the event-study 
methodology requires the estimation of a baseline economic indicator or a market model. 
 
In line with the “portfolio approach” to modelling exchange-rate returns described above, all 
regressions include “fundamentals,” (i.e. other relevant markets) as regressors. As is the case for 
financial investments, real assets are of particular interest. Therefore, the baseline economic 
model, to which our exogenous political variable ‘European summit’ is added, makes an 
allowance for the impact of both US and European returns on stocks and bonds. From a finance 
perspective, long-term interest rates are risk-adjusted averages of expected future short rates, 
whereas stock markets capture alternative investment opportunities. We deploy interest rates for 
US-treasury bonds (10-year maturity) [BOND]. As regards stock markets, the empirical analysis 
considers the (first-lagged) Dow Jones Index [USSTOCK] and the EuroStoxx 50 [EURSTOCK].
1 
 
Bond values depict the long-term prospects for economic growth so that an increase in US-bond 
returns implies a decline in the euro-dollar exchange rate. Furthermore, the analysis takes into 
account the 10-year interest rate differential between 10-year German bonds and US Treasury 
Bonds. The former conventionally provides the benchmark bond within Europe. 
 
As international financial activities are still mainly invoiced in US Dollars, an increase in US 
stock returns offers a risk-free enhanced exchange-rate return, hence bringing about euro 
depreciation. At the same time, an increase in European stock returns heightens the foreign-
                                                 
1 The resulting preliminary regression analysis comprising both several robust OLS (not reported) and GARCH 
models demonstrates that a best-fit model comprises these economic data. In addition, the resulting time series are 
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exchange risk exposure of global US-dollar denominated portfolios. In order to reduce this 
exchange risk exposure, international investors may shift portfolios towards US assets (Hau and 
Rey 2004). Accordingly, we expect a decline of the euro-dollar exchange rate – i.e. an 
appreciation of the US-dollar – in the course of expected higher earnings for European firms 
listed on the stock market. 
 
This baseline economic model implicitly accounts for the influence of relevant US political news 
on stock and bond assets as well as for the impact of decisions and announcements (for example) 
made by the European Central Bank (ECB) on the euro-dollar exchange rate. A possible 
limitation of our rather simplified “portfolio approach” is that the considered returns capture 
several “micro risks,” including default risks and liquidity risks. Caveats also apply due to the 
limited availability of relevant data such as trading volumes. Hence, the empirical results have to 
be interpreted with caution. 
 
The set of exogenous political variables, which are added to the baseline economic model, 
includes the dummies for the political events of interest, i.e. European summits [SUMM]. As 
discussed in the previous section, we first check whether such events affect the level of 
exchange-rate returns. Second, we must determine whether the occurrence of these political 
events increases volatility by enhancing perceived political uncertainty. In addition, we will use 
an event study to examine the impact of each meeting of the European Council on (abnormal) 
returns accruing to euro-currency assets. When examining the financial community’s reaction to 
political decisions taken at European summits, we distinguish between integrative and 
disintegrative events. The former refers to unexpected settlements of conflicts within the EU, 
whereas the latter depicts outcomes that produce a detrimental effect on international financial 
investors’ expectations. 
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With regard to political events, we encounter the problem that they at times occur on non-trading 
days, particularly weekends or holidays. Two general approaches can be adopted to surmount 
linkage problems associated with event dates and effects on the currency markets. First, we can 
interpolate financial time-series data in order to obtain values for non-trading days. In doing so, 
however, we would pollute the variation in our financial times-series data. Hence, we opt for the 
second approach, which entails shifting the political event to the following trading day. For 
example, we treat a European Council meeting that takes place on Saturday and Sunday as if it 
occurred on Monday. The newly created 3-day-event “window,” with one pre- and one post-
event day, would then typically comprise Friday, Monday and Tuesday. With such a spread, we 
tend to form a more appropriate impression of financial market reactions to particular kinds of 
events. 
 
4.2  Diagnostic Tests 
This study aims to estimate the effects of three particular types of political events on daily 
investment returns associated with the euro. “Unit roots” comprise a frequently encountered 
problem with high-frequency time-series analyses. “Unit roots” refer to “non-stationarity” in 
time-series analyses, i.e. when mean and variance are not time-independent. In this case, past 
effects are appropriate predictors of present effects. Hence, yesterday’s – even logarithmic – 
level of the euro-dollar exchange rate almost perfectly explains today’s euro level. Using a 
differenced – i.e. ‘integrated’ – time-series analysis may resolve the problem of non-stationarity. 
We iteratively test the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, using decreasing numbers, with a 
maximum of five lags. At the same time, we allow for trend and drift components, as well as for 
a suppressed constant in the exchange-rate time series. In accordance with the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), we choose an appropriate model that reveals stationarity in time-
ssilvia  12/21/06 1:16 AM
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series analyses: Both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, as well as the non-parametric 
Phillips-Perron (PP) test, clearly show that the null hypothesis of a unit root from the logarithmic 
exchange-rate time series cannot be rejected, but that the time series integrated of order one I is 
stationary without a constant at the 1% significance level (not reported). However, first-
differencing renders the daily logarithmic data stationary.
2  
 
Overall, 1812 observations remain after first-differencing logarithmic euro-dollar exchange rates 
and after reassigning political events to trading days as well as subsequently eliminating non-
trading days. Figure 1 portrays all euro-dollar exchange-rate returns. Visual inspection of these 
returns indicates that there is considerable volatility throughout the entire sample, whereas a 
series of higher peaks pointing to periods of jittery foreign-exchange markets – possibly due to 
increased political uncertainty relating to relevant political events – are hardly visible. 
 
Figure 1, Daily Exchange-Rate Return, 1999-2005 
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2 Henceforth, we simply speak of “returns” to imply first-differenced logarithmic values except when otherwise 
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The preliminary summary statistics (Table 1) show that the returns for euro-dollar exchange-rate 
investments are not excessively skewed or characterised by excess kurtosis. However, the Jarque-
Bera 
2 ! -test statistic of 29.59 indicates that the null hypothesis testing normal distribution 
cannot be accepted at any conventional significance level; hence, the returns are not normally 
distributed. The Ljung-Box (LB) test statistic for serial correlation of error terms is highly 
significant. The same applies to the Lagrange multiplier tests in the form of a LB
2-test, which 
reveals that there is autocorrelation among squared residuals, indicating ARCH-effects, i.e. 
conditional heteroskedasticity. Accordingly, error terms are time-dependent; thus the “noise” is 
still saturated with information for further inference. 
Table 1, Diagnostic Tests 
  ∆ln €/$ 
Minimum  -2.67 
Maximum  2.36 
Mean  .0007 
Variance  .6543 
Skewness  .0772 
Excess Kurtosis  .6064 
LB(1)  8.479*** 
LB
2(6)  11.838* 
LB
2(10)  25.006*** 
Jarque-Bera  29.59*** 
Notes: Exchange rates are first-differenced logarithms multiplied 
by 100, i.e. percentage points of (continuous) returns. LB(i) 
represents the χ
2-distributed Ljung-Box Q-statistics under the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. The LB
2(i) tests for serial 
correlation of the squared residuals out to lag i. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
This preliminary summary statistic gives rise to a GARCH analysis that accounts for the 
prevailing autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity among returns for euro-dollar exchange-
rate investments. Most notably, the empirical test helps to detect abnormal returns as well as 
volatility effects linked to particular types of political events. The following analysis ultimately 
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ascertains the exchange-rate effects of policy outcomes following European summits. In doing 
so, we check whether this political event category explains variation in returns and volatility of 
euro-dollar exchange-rate movements. 
 
4.3  Empirical Tests 
In this section, we first conduct several GARCH regressions and discuss the results. In other 
words, we clarify the influence that both disintegrative/integrative and overall summit outcomes 
exert on the mean and volatility of euro-dollar exchange-rate returns. Then, concerning level 
effects and abnormal returns, we rely on the event study methodology in order to single out the 
impact of any one political event. The empirical analysis utilizes a 3- to 7-day event window. We 
discard options for larger event windows for two reasons. First, we can hardly conceive of an 
investor calculus that overemphasizes the importance of political events in terms of watching 
political action. Second, the larger the event window, the higher the probability that unobserved 
events will blur the effects under study. This results because our regression models wrongly 
estimates actual returns at about 0.62 percentage points on average (not reported). Given that the 
range of returns roughly lies between -2.7% to 2.4%, our score is prone to estimation errors in the 
case of overly stretched event windows. 
 
In particular, the GARCH regression model attempts to reveal potential volatility effects of 
political events. In doing so, we aim to capture the political uncertainty that may be linked to 
statements or policy outcomes issuing from European Council meetings. An altered assessment 
of political risks may be reflected in the conditional mean and variance of exchange-rate returns. 
As is the case with event data analysis in international politics, especially in the field of conflict 
research, the GARCH portion of our econometric analysis pays attention to a specific category of 
political events, i.e. European Council meetings. 
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The analysis starts out by deploying a basic GARCH (1,1) specification but is later further 
refined. When studying the effects of political events on euro-dollar exchange-rate movements, 
we finally opt for using an autoregressive (AR) (1)-GARCH(1,1) model without a constant in the 
mean equation, as this model exhibits the best AIC value. Modelling the mean by such an AR 
pattern is frequently applied in financial applications (Wilfing 2001:21). While suppressing the 
regression constant in a market model of (real) returns on stock and bond market assets would be 
rather inappropriate, we can justify using this technique to model exchange-rate returns: The 
constant would depict an average investment return in terms of euro-dollar currency assets. 
However, exchange rates are prices that do not pertain to any immediate surplus value in terms of 
real production, i.e. there is no interest earned that is subject to market appraisal as is the case 
with securities.
3 Hence, suppressing the constant seems to be admissible from a theoretical point 
of view. 
 
The mean specification of the GARCH-regression refers to a simple model for the behaviour of 
our daily exchange-rate returns 
 
2
,       1 ~ (0, ) t t t t t t r r N ! ! " # = + + X , 
 
where  1 t r!  is the autoregressive term AR(1) of the euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the US-dollar at 
time  -1 t ;  t X  is a set of exogenous variables including, for instance, our dummies for European 
Council meetings thought to influence exchange-rate returns; and  t !  is a normally distributed 
error term with mean zero and unit variance. As GARCH regression models account for time-
                                                 
3 In addition, currency investments reflect international financial investors’ hedging behaviour by taking into account 
the foreign exchange-rate risk exposure of their portfolios and security investments.  Deleted: Fahrholz/Schneider
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varying variance, 
2
t ! , of the error term, the following variance equation completes our AR(1)-
GARCH(1,1) model: 
2
1
2 2
1 t t t t ! " #$ %!
& & = + + +äZ , 
where !  is the long-term mean of the variance;  and !  and !  (respectively) represent the 
relative influence exerted on present variance by (1) news encapsulated in past errors, 
2
1 t ! " , and 
(2) the forecasted variance from the prior period, 
2
1 t ! " .  Finally,  t äZ  represents another set of 
exogenous variables weighted by a coefficient vector, ä , which, we argue, are relevant in 
explaining some of the volatility characterizing exchange-rate returns. 
 
Table 2 displays the regression results for four models, A–D, which relate to a 3-day event 
window, comprising one pre-event day and one post-event day.
4 Model A consists of the vanilla 
GARCH(1,1) model according to which all independent economic variables in the mean equation 
are highly significant. As expected, higher returns on US-bonds [BOND] breed lower returns on 
euro investments as a result of rising demand for US-Dollars. At the same time, higher (lagged) 
US stock returns [USSTOCK] result in an appreciation of the euro currency, whereas higher 
returns on European stocks [EURSTOCK] cause a drop in the euro-dollar exchange rate. In line 
with the findings of the new literature on portfolio balancing and exchange-rate movements (see 
above), these reactions to changes in stock returns may be traced back to international investors’ 
behaviour, i.e. the restructuring of their portfolios’ exchange-rate risk exposure (especially, Hau 
and Rey 2004). Last but not least, the significant constant in the mean equation of the vanilla 
GARCH(1,1) indicates that the average return on euro-currency asset investment (from the onset 
                                                 
4 We also consider two 4-day event windows with two pre-event days and one post-event day (2-1 window) and vice 
versa  (1-2  window).  Moreover,  we  modelled  a  5-day  event  window  with  two  pre-  and  post-event  days  (2-2 
window). First regressions have pointed to a relatively high importance of post-event days. For that reason, we also 
model 5- to 7-day event windows with an increasing number of post-event days. The results for all these windows 
are not displayed in order to conserve space. However, the p-values for our political event coefficient seem to 
increase  with  the  number  of  days  included  within  the  event  window,  i.e.  there  is  a  diminishing  level  of 
significance. 
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of EMU in 1999 until the end of 2005) reached, roughly, a meagre 0.04%. 
 
We suppress the constant in the second economic baseline model that comprises an 
autoregressive dependent variable on the right hand side of the mean equation (model B in Table 
2). Previous regression results for our economic variables are confirmed. Simultaneously, the 
significant AR(1)-term indicates that a positive change in exchange-rate returns in a prior period 
– i.e. a revaluation of the euro relative to the US-dollar – implies a decrease in abnormal returns 
indicated in the subsequent period. 
Table 2, Summary Statistics 
Mean Equation 
Coefficient  Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D 
AR(1)    -.062*** 
(.023) 
-.062*** 
(.023) 
-.059*** 
(.023) 
BOND  -.092*** 
(.013) 
-.094*** 
(.013) 
-.094*** 
(.013) 
-.094*** 
(.013) 
USSTOCK  .092*** 
(.013) 
.093*** 
(.013) 
.093*** 
(.013) 
.092*** 
(.013) 
EURSTOCK  -.083*** 
(.010) 
-.082*** 
(.010) 
-.082*** 
(.010) 
-.083*** 
(.011) 
SUMM (1-1)      .030 
(.062)   
Constant  .001 
(.709)       
Variance Equation 
!   .001* 
(.003) 
.004 
(.003) 
.004 
(.003) 
.006* 
(.003) 
!   .025*** 
(.007) 
.019*** 
(.007) 
.019*** 
(.007) 
.019*** 
(.007) 
!   .960*** 
(.013) 
.971*** 
(.012) 
.971*** 
(.012) 
.967*** 
(.013) 
SUMM (1-1)        -.023** 
(.011) 
AIC  1.869  1.861  1.862  1.860 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The signs *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Number of 
observations, n=1812. 
 
Again, such reactions may be attributed to portfolio-balancing effects due to altering foreign-
ssilvia  12/21/06 1:08 AM
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exchange risk exposure, which stems from the dominant role played by the US-dollar in 
international finance. 
 
Regarding the variance equation, both model A and B produce a negligible GARCH-constant ω 
and persistent shocks in euro-dollar exchange-rate returns. The small ARCH error coefficient α -- 
the first term in the GARCH(1,1) model – implies that volatility indicators are not highly 
“spiked.” This observation suggests that “new information” would produce intensive 
repercussions on the conditional variance. In fact, the large GARCH lag coefficient β – the 
second term in the GARCH(1,1)-model – demonstrates that shocks to conditional variance take a 
long time to die out, i.e. volatility is “persistent.” A persistent effect of “new information” on 
daily returns is rather commonly observed in exchange-rate series studies (Bernhard and Leblang 
2006:14f.). Since the sum of the coefficients  1 ! " + < , the process is mean-reverting, and an 
unconditional variance, 
2
t ! , is generated.
5 In addition, these results can be interpreted as a sign of 
estimate robustness: sums greater than one would point to non-linearities in investor reactions, 
i.e. altering patterns of variance factors. Altering patterns of variance would require the 
application of a Markov switching model (cf. Wilfing 2001:23). With regard to the vanilla 
GARCH(1,1) model A, the smaller AIC reveals that the more sophisticated economic baseline 
model B -- AR(1)-GARCH(1,1)  -- improves the overall performance of the regression. 
 
The political variable [SUMM], representing European Council meetings, is added to the set of 
economic variables in model C and D (see Table 2). According to model C, this category of 
political events is completely insignificant and does not explain any changes in the mean of 
exchange-rate returns. However, the coefficient for European summits shows that SUMM exerts 
significant influence on the volatility of euro-dollar exchange-rate returns in model D (see table 
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2). According to our analysis, the volatility of exchange-rate returns slightly decreases – though 
we expected a surge – following European intergovernmental meetings by about 0.02 percentage 
points. We also find significance at the 5%-level for variables incorporating a 1-2 and a 2-2 event 
window, and significance at the 10% level for a 2-1 event window. (Larger event windows do not 
suggest significant influence of European summits, measured at conventional confidence levels.) 
At present, we cannot fully explain the drop in exchange-rate volatility following 
intergovernmental meetings. However, we suggest that the reduction in excess variance might be 
attributed to a wait-and-see attitude of international investors.
6 
 
Table 3, Diagnostics for Standardized Residuals 
Tests  ∆ln €/$ 
LB(1)  .005 
LB
2(6)  .018 
LB
2(10)  .003 
Jarque-Bera  21.718*** 
Notes: LB(i) represents the χ
2-distributed Ljung-Box Q-statistics 
under the null hypothesis indicating no serial correlation. The 
LB
2(i) tests for serial correlation of the squared residuals out to 
lag i. The sign *** denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
Post-estimation diagnostic tests demonstrate that the standardized residuals do not suffer from 
further serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (see Table 3). The LB test statistics for both 
residuals and squared residuals are not significant at any confidence level, conventionally 
measured. Hence, we might conclude that the error terms generated after applying the GARCH 
regression model are independently and identically distributed as well as mean zero and variance 
one series. However, the Jarque-Bera test of 21.781 indicates that the GARCH regression does 
not completely ensure that the residual distribution is normally distributed. Model E represents an 
                                                 
6 Data on order flows would possibly shed more light on investor behaviour; However, this is a topic for future 
research. 
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improved estimate compared with the Jarque-Bera test statistic in Table 1.
7 
 
In sum, our AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) specification is robust and an appropriate model properly 
coping with volatility effects by correcting for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. 
Hence, the coefficients represent rather unbiased estimators. The coefficient for [SUMM], 
(intergovernmental meetings at the European level), captures the effects of policy discussions 
surrounding European integration; these events are shown to significantly affect the volatility of 
the euro. Further investigation into the influence of particular political events may help provide 
further insights regarding mean and abnormal level effects. 
 
In the following paragraphs, we turn to the event study part of the empirical analysis. By doing 
so, we check whether European Council meetings affect the euro-dollar exchange rate. Our event 
study makes use of the aforementioned event window sizes. 
 
Regressions generate residuals, interpreted as abnormal returns, which may possibly be attributed 
to the political events of interest. In order to unravel these potential effects on abnormal returns, 
abnormal returns are conventionally cumulated over a predefined event window. Inaccuracies 
that result from assigning political events that occur on weekends or holidays to particular trading 
days demand the use of an event window larger than a single day. However, the aforementioned 
tendency for error, as well as the detected persistence of volatility effects, suggest that the event 
window should be limited to no more than a few days.   
 
The abnormal returns, attributed to political events, are calculated with the help of predicted 
returns, which are generated from regressions of returns within an estimation window. Such a 
                                                 
7 Our regressions also account for a t-distribution of standardized residuals with unchanging coefficient values (not 
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window comprises intervals of days during which no particular event of interest takes place. A 
sufficiently large estimation window prepares the ground for predicting residuals within the event 
window. These returns are then subtracted from actual residuals resulting from abnormal returns 
linked to political events. The null hypothesis establishes that there are no significant cumulative 
abnormal returns during the event window. A t-test finally indicates whether the null hypothesis 
can be rejected or not. If we can reject the null hypothesis, at least at the 5% significance level, 
then we can assume that the particular political event influences investment returns for the euro 
currency. 
 
Our analysis depends on the use of a specific estimation window. Because of multiple political 
events that take place during our euro-dollar exchange-rate series, it is hardly possible to find a 
sufficiently large estimation window that is not interspersed with some kind of a political event, 
i.e. a European Council meeting. Conventional event studies rely on continuous periods forming 
an estimation window, sometimes comprising up to 100 weeks before the onset of an event 
(Guidolin and La Ferrara 2005). This procedure is appropriate for events that take place outside 
the time period indicated for the estimation window. However, our sample covers European 
Council meetings, which take place fairly regularly, or twice a year. Accordingly, we define 
intervals of estimation periods as starting ten days prior to and another ten days following a 
European Council meeting. 
 
Subtracting predicted residuals from actual residuals generated from the regression produces the 
abnormal returns that are linked to the political events of special interest to our research. The 
regression results for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are summarized in Table 4. The table 
reports all European Council meetings and CARs, which are significant at the level of 5%, or 
higher. In addition, the results are categorized into four separate event windows: from one pre-
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event day to an increasing number of post-event days. The inclusion of more than one single pre-
event day does not contribute to significant abnormal returns (not reported). 
 
Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns 
  1-1 event 
window 
1-2 event 
window 
1-3 event 
window 
1-4 event 
window 
Issues at stake 
Feira, 
6/19-20/2000 
-2.02  -2.22  -  -  Relax rules governing 
banking security 
Copenhagen, 
12/12-13/2002 
1.91  -  -  -  Agreement on candidate 
countries accession 
Brussels, 
12/12.-132003 
0.80  1.13  1.27  -  Delay of “dismal” EU 
decision-making rules 
(constitutional draft) 
Brussels, 
22.-23.03.2005 
-1.31  -  -  -  Change to fiscal rules, i.e. 
deteriorating the stability 
pact 
Notes: Table displays cumulative abnormal returns significant at least at the 5% level 
 
Table 4 surveys all twenty-seven European Council meetings that took place between 1999-2005. 
Interestingly, a few European summits exert significant influence on cumulative abnormal 
returns. Contrary to results generated from our GARCH regressions, this portion of the empirical 
analysis evidences level or mean effects on euro-dollar exchange-rate returns. This result tends to 
underscore the finding that smaller event windows generate significant effects, while stretching 
event windows undermines significance. The event study demonstrates that the European 
summits in Feira, Copenhagen and two further meetings in Brussels affected euro-dollar 
exchange rates. The summits in Feira (2000) and in Brussels (2005) were followed by a drop in 
exchange-rate returns, whereas the meetings in Copenhagen (2002) and Brussels (2003) correlate 
with positive excess returns for the case of the 1-1 event window. Further content analyses could 
shed more light on why these particular political events affected the euro-dollar exchange rate. 
The event study, at a minimum, lends support to previous results suggesting an importance of 
European summit outcomes for investor calculus. 
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5  Conclusion 
Financial markets, such as foreign-exchange markets, provide an interesting research field for 
political scientists, who want to explore the relevance of political events for market evaluations. 
Theoretical discussions have emphasized the impact of new (policy-related) information on 
exchange rates. Exchange rates are considered to be asset prices, which also respond to political 
news that, in turn, affect future returns on other assets. Financial markets are sensitive to events 
that may influence future prospects for economic growth. This observation generally applies to 
key policy decisions made at the European level, as well. In this paper, we have demonstrated 
that decisions reached about prospects for economic and political integration during European 
Council meetings explain some of the volatility and level effects on euro-currency investment 
returns. 
 
Variables measuring political events, as well as economic indicators representing stock and bond 
asset returns, adequately capture volatility in euro-dollar exchange-rate movements in the AR(1)-
GARCH model delineated in this paper. We further extended the event study methodology to 
capture event-specific investor reactions. Events studied in this paper also seem to produce 
abnormal returns for euro-dollar exchange-rate investments. 
 
In conclusion, the analysis is robust and suggests that European Council meetings trigger 
political uncertainty, which translates into changed evaluations of foreign-exchange markets. 
Isolated intergovernmental meetings among EU member-states do affect the behaviour of 
international financial investors, as revealed by the consequent generation of abnormal returns. 
Overall, we find empirical evidence to suggest that agreements made at European Council 
meetings exert considerable influence on the euro value. Hence, public reservations regarding the 
economic and political relevance of European summits may have to be reconsidered in the course 
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of continuing European integration. ssilvia  12/21/06 1:13 AM
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